Abstract This paper analyzes a market game in which sellers offer trading mechanisms to buyers and buyers decide which seller to go to depending on the trading mechanisms offered. In a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market. As the size of the market increases, the entry fee decreases and converges to zero in the limit. We study how the surplus of buyers and sellers depends on the number of agents on each side of the market in this decentralized trading environment.
Introduction
This paper presents a model of decentralized trading in which sellers compete for a common pool of customers by offering trade mechanisms. Each seller is placed at a different location and offers one unit of a homogeneous good to buyers. Each buyer observes the available trading opportunities and decides whether to enter the market and which seller to go to. Buyer entry into the market is associated with a fixed cost, and buyers have independent private values for the good drawn from the same probability distribution. All agents are risk neutral. After going to a particular seller, each buyer learns his valuation and competes with the other buyers who visit the same seller by submitting a bid. This type of competition is akin to a variety of markets, e.g. markets for real estate, rental housing, used cars, or goods traded via the Internet. Although the model paints a highly stylized picture of trade, and abstracts from many of the institutional details of each of the aforementioned markets, it helps gain valuable insights into the nature of competition and the distribution of rents in such a decentralized trading environment.
The main purpose of this paper is to describe the trade mechanisms that sellers use in a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market game. We analyze equilibria in which buyers play symmetric mixed strategies by randomizing across all sellers, and equilibria in which buyers coordinate by playing pure selection strategies (i.e. choose one of the sellers or stay out of the market with a probability of one).
It is well known from the monopoly literature on auctions with endogenous entry that, when buyers make their entry decision prior to knowing their valuations, it is optimal for the seller to use a mechanism that assigns the item to the highestvaluation bidder if this valuation is higher than the seller's cost, and to keep the item otherwise (see McAfee and McMillan 1987; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1993; Levin and Smith 1994; Chakraborty and Kosmopoulou 2001; Lu 2008) . That is, the seller uses an auction with an efficient reserve price and charges an entry fee chosen so as to expropriate the entire surplus from buyers without causing them to exit the market. We identify a sufficient condition on the equilibrium behavior of buyers for which the same result applies in a setting of competing mechanism designers (Lemma 1). For this type of buyer continuation equilibria, in the first stage of the market game, sellers hold auctions with an efficient reserve price, and charge an entry fee that can vary with the number of bidders who participate in the auction (Lemma 2). There is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which sellers hold auctions with an entry fee that does not vary with the number of participants, and buyers randomize across sellers in the continuation equilibrium. We derive the entry fee in this equilibrium as a function of the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market (Proposition 1). The obtained closed form solution allows us to derive some new comparative statics results.
Perhaps most surprisingly, we find that, for certain values of the buyer cost of entry into the market, the availability of one additional seller leads to higher entry fees in equilibrium (Corollary 1). Most of the existing literature either considers the case of two sellers (see e.g. Burguet and Sakovics 1999; Moldovanu et al. 2008) or posits large markets ( see e.g.McAfee 1993; Peters 1997; Peters and Severinov 1997; Satterthwaite and Shneyerov 2007; Shneyerov and Wong 2010; Eeckhout and Kircher 2010) , and,
